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UNLAWFUL REPRIEVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 747 OF THE 
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT 
J. Michael Morgalis*
In July 2009, President Barack Obama declared his strong opposition 
to congressional measures aimed at restoring dealerships terminated in 
the Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) and General Motors (GM) 
bankruptcies.
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1  Further, the Obama Administration stated that such 
congressional action would create “dangerous precedent” because of the 
possible intervention into closed judicial bankruptcy proceedings.2  
Despite this opposition, in December 2009 Congress passed a bill 
providing rejected car dealerships a chance for reinstatement by 
appealing their cases to an arbitrator.3  The result of the legislation has 
been twofold: on the one hand, hundreds of dealerships have been 
reinstated; however, on the other hand, the bill has raised questions 
regarding Congress’s constitutional authority to enact such a bill.4
 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review; A.B. Harvard College.  
The author would like to thank Professor Aaron Bryant for his suggestion of the topic and his guidance; 
Professor Michael Solimine for his global comments and reference to important sources of information; 
and Professor Kristin Kalsem for her comments.  Also, many thanks to Jonah Knobler, Esq. for his 
editing efforts. 
 1. Brian Faler, Obama Opposes House Plan to Protect Chrysler, GM Dealerships, 
BLOOMBERG, July 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
aioxPp9w.vzM; Ken Thomas, Obama Auto Task Force Warns Against Dealer Plan, CRAIN’S DETROIT 
BUS., July 21, 2009, http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20090721/ FREE/907219975# (stating that 
Chrysler and GM “had far too many dealers relative to the number of cars they were selling” and that 
the average Toyota dealer was selling four times as many vehicles as the average Chevrolet dealer). 
  This 
Comment will focus on the latter and suggests that Congress acted 
unconstitutionally when it enacted Section 747 of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act.  Specifically, congressional action seemingly 
reopened final judicial judgments from the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy 
proceedings, and the consequences of its actions could create a 
 2. Thomas, supra note 1. 
 3. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009). 
 4. Tom Krisher, Chrysler to Let 50 Dealers Rejoin Sales Network, ABC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10209751 [hereinafter Krisher, 50 Dealers]; Tom 
Krisher, More U.S. Dealers Appeal Chrysler, GM Shutdowns, MANUFACTURING.NET, Jan. 22, 2010, 
http://www.manufacturing.net/News-More-Dealers-Appeal-Chrysler-GM-Shutdowns-012210.aspx 
[hereinafter Krisher, Dealers Appeal]. 
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precedent allowing for similar acts in the future. 
In early 2009, Chrysler and GM faced declining revenues and an 
inability to pay their creditors.  As a result, each filed for bankruptcy in 
the spring of 2009 under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.5  Within 
forty days of their respective bankruptcy filings, Chrysler and GM 
successfully completed their transactions that created the entities “New 
Chrysler” and “New GM.”6  In forming these new entities, each car 
manufacturer abrogated a large number of franchise agreements within 
their dealership networks to become more cost-effective and 
competitive.7  Dealerships objected to such actions but were unable to 
persuade the bankruptcy court to reinstate their agreements.8
Subsequently, Congress sought information explaining why certain 
dealerships were closed and on what grounds.
 
9  Congress eventually 
responded to the termination of thousands of dealerships by enacting 
Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,10 which provided 
potential remedies for discontinued dealerships via an arbitration process 
with either Chrysler or GM.  Since the passage of the bill, Chrysler and 
GM have granted reprieve to hundreds of arbitration-eligible dealerships 
that were scheduled to be eliminated through the reorganization process 
of each company.11
This Comment argues that Congress’s enactment of Section 747 of 
Consolidated Appropriations Act is unconstitutional as it pertains to the 
separation of powers.  Part II of this Comment outlines the jurisprudence 
of bankruptcy courts as well as their inherent authority despite being 
non-Article III judges.  It also discusses the GM and Chrysler 
bankruptcy court decisions and Congress’s reaction.  Part III considers 
two prominent Supreme Court cases dealing with congressional actions 
  Thus, this legislation allowed car dealerships, 
permissibly terminated in bankruptcy proceedings, to circumvent the 
final judgments issued by the Southern District of New York 
Bankruptcy Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 5. Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy; U.A.W. and Fiat to Take 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009 at A1; Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama is Upbeat for G.M. 
Future on Day of Pain, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009 at A1. 
 6. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Chrysler Gets Judge’s Approval for Asset Sale, WASH. POST, June 
1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/01/AR2009060100804.html; 
Steven Mufson & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Post-Bankruptycy GM Will Have Work Cut Out For It, 
WASH. POST, July 7, 2009, at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/ 
2009/07/06/AR2009070600450.html. 
 7. Associated Press, GM Begins Announcing its 1,100 Dealership Closures, FOX NEWS, May 
15, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520281,00.html. 
 8. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 515 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 9. H.R. RES. 591, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 10. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009). 
 11. Krisher, 50 Dealers, supra note 4. 
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to reopen or limit judicial decisions.  Part IV examines the 
constitutionality of Section 747, a provision that offered Chrysler and 
GM car dealerships retroactive opportunity for arbitration.  Finally, Part 
V concludes that the measures taken by Congress were unconstitutional, 
but because of the unique relationship between the car companies and 
the federal government, no legal actions will likely ensue.  Without a 
challenge to Congress’s authority to circumvent final judicial decisions, 
precedent will exist allowing for similar behavior in the future. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the issues raised by Section 747 of Consolidated 
Appropriations Act and the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, it is 
necessary to discuss the jurisprudence surrounding bankruptcy courts 
and their authority to grant final decisions.  This Part first discusses the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co.12
In Northern Pipeline, the Court considered whether the jurisdictional 
grant to bankruptcy judges in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violated 
Article III of the Constitution.
  Next, it outlines Congress’s reaction to 
Northern Pipeline, which essentially codified the Court’s holding and 
established the bankruptcy infrastructure still intact today.  This Part 
then describes the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy decisions.  Finally, it 
analyzes the bill Congress passed in response to the automotive 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
A. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 
13  The Act prescribed that bankruptcy 
judges were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate for terms of fourteen years.14  The judges were subject to 
removal for extreme behavior and their salaries statutorily set.15  The 
Act also granted bankruptcy judges jurisdiction over all civil 
proceedings brought under or arising under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.16
 
 12. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 13. Id. at 52. 
 14. Id. at 53. 
 15. Id.  The salaries could be adjusted through the Federal Salary Act.  Judges could be removed 
for “‘incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability.’”  Id. (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)). 
 16. Id. at 54 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)). 
  Panels of three judges could also be established to 
hear appeals of final judgments, orders, decrees, and interlocutory 
3
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appeals.17
 The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme and 
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, 
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall 
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
 
When considering the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, the 
Court cited Article III of the Constitution, which states: 
18
From this clause the Court concluded it was the Framers’ intent to have 
an independent judiciary that enjoys life tenure with fixed and 
irreducible compensation.
 
19  Because under the Bankruptcy Act the 
bankruptcy judges were not given life tenure and their compensation 
could be reduced, the Court found that the judges were clearly not 
Article III judges.20  The Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Act 
impermissibly removed judicial power from Article III courts and gave 
that power to non-Article III adjunct courts.21
On July 10, 1984, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
 
B. Congress’s Response to Northern Pipeline 
22   Pursuant to the statute, in each 
judicial district, bankruptcy courts would constitute a unit of the district 
court.23  The Act stated that bankruptcy judges were to be appointed by 
the United States court of appeals of the circuit in which a particular 
district was located.24  The judges were to have terms of fourteen years 
and serve as judicial officers of the United States district court 
established under Article III of the Constitution.25  However, bankruptcy 
judges could be removed during their term for “incompetence, 
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability” when a 
majority of the judicial council of the circuit in which the judge’s 
official duty station is located support the removal.26
 
 17. Id. at 55 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 160, 1482 (1976 ed., Supp. IV)). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, quoted in N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58–59. 
 19. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. at 61. 
 21. Id. at 87.  Such courts are also called Article I courts. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006).  The appointments are to be based on the recommendations of 
the Judicial Conference.  Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006). 
  Bankruptcy judges 
4
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were appointed to work full-time and receive a salary at the annual rate 
determined by statute.27
The Act further stipulated that district courts could refer any or all 
cases that arose or related to a case under Chapter 11 to the bankruptcy 
judges of that district.
 
28  Once presented with a case under Chapter 11, 
bankruptcy judges could enter appropriate orders and judgments (that 
were subject to review) for any core proceedings.29
The Act gave the federal district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from final judgments, orders, and decrees entered by bankruptcy 
judges.
 
30  However, a panel of bankruptcy judges could comprise an 
appellate panel so long as a majority of district judges in the district of 
the appeal authorized such an appeal.31  The Act also gave the courts of 
appeals jurisdiction over appeals of all final decisions, judgments, 
orders, and decrees when certain issues have not been previously 
addressed, when a split among courts exists on an issue, or when an 
immediate appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or 
proceeding in which the appeal is taken.32
Despite some minor amendments, the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 remains in force today.  The Act 
addressed the exact holding of Northern Pipeline, leaving no doubt that 
bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges.  However, despite 
bankruptcy judges being inferior to Article III judges in the eyes of the 
Constitution, the Act’s language seemingly permits bankruptcy judges to 
issue final judgments, which is important for the purpose of this 
Comment.
 
33
 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).  The current version reads: “a salary at an annual rate that is equal 
to 92 percent of the salary of a judge of the district court of the United States as determined pursuant to 
section 135 [28 U.S.C. § 135 (2006)], to be paid at such times as the Judicial Conference of the United 
States determines.”  28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2006). 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).  Core proceedings can include such things as: matters 
concerning the administration of the estate; allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or 
exemptions from property of the estate; counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against 
the estate; orders in respect to obtaining credit; orders to turn over property of the estate; proceedings to 
determine, avoid, or recover preferences; motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay; 
proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances; determinations as to the 
dischargeability of particular debts; objections to discharges; determinations of the validity, extent, or 
priority of liens; confirmations of plans; orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use 
of cash collateral.  Id. § (b)(2)(A–M).  However, a bankruptcy judge could hear a non-core proceeding 
where the case was related to Title 11.  Id. § (c)(1).  Cases, with consent of both parties, could also be 
referred from the district courts to the bankruptcy courts.  Id. § (c)(2). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b–c) (2006). 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(a) (2006). 
  Additionally, the Act outlines the conditions under which 
 33. While 28 U.S.C. § 158 does not define what constitutes a final decision, case law is 
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appeals may be heard by appellate courts, which is important in the 
context of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies. 
C. Reorganization of Chrysler and GM 
1. Dire Financial Struggles 
By early 2009, it was apparent that Chrysler and GM would not 
survive despite billions of dollars in federal funding they received the 
previous fiscal year.34  Because of their financial troubles, both 
automobile giants had essentially one option: file for reorganization 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  However, unlike many 
Chapter 11 filings, the Chrysler and GM scenarios were different 
because neither company could fiscally sustain a long, drawn-out 
bankruptcy process.35
Chrysler and GM were faced with liquidating their assets and 
receiving roughly 10% of book value for those assets or agreeing to be 
purchased by third parties including the United States Treasury, Canada, 
Ontario, and Fiat.
 
36  However, liquidation could have been a “disastrous 
result”37 for the creditors of both companies leaving as the only practical 
choice the sale of their assets under § 363(b) of Chapter 11.38  
Traditionally, companies in Chapter 11 must submit a reorganization 
plan for the bankruptcy court to approve prior to a sale of assets; 
however, § 363 allows for debtors to sell their assets without submitting 
a plan in certain situations.39
 
instructive on the matter.  Courts have found that the confirmation of organization plans is a final 
judgment.  See Holsten v. Brill, 987 F.2d 1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. 
v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1990); Sanders Confectionery Prods. v. Heller 
Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992).  Courts have also held that 11 U.S.C. § 363 sales are final 
decisions.  See In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1986); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 
F.3d 721, 732 (8th Cir. 2004); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-L-Wood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 34. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89–91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 35. See In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, Parker v. 
Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 36. Id. at 481–83. 
 37. Id. at 474. 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).  The bankruptcy code is complex and beyond the scope of this 
Comment; however, this subsection will present enough information about the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies for the reader to analyze Part IV of this Comment. 
 39. See In re Chysler, 405 B.R. at 94–96. 
 
The economic environment leading up to the GM and Chrysler 
bankruptcies made evident the urgency and necessity for a quick sale of 
assets.  First, President Obama’s statements made clear that time was 
critical: 
6
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 What I’m talking about is using our existing legal structure as a tool 
that, with the backing of the U.S. Government, can make it easier for 
General Motors . . . to quickly clear away old debts that are weighing [it] 
down so that [it] can get back on [its] feet and onto a path to success . . . . 
 What I’m not talking about is a process where a company is simply 
broken up, sold off, and no longer exists.  We’re not talking about that.  
And what I’m not talking about is a company that’s stuck in court for 
years, unable to get out.40
Second, a successful sale quickly accomplished would help the 
companies avoid systemic failure, allow for continued employment of 
many Americans and restore consumer confidence in Chrysler and GM 
products.
 
41  Finally, there was a lack of merger partners, acquirers, and 
investors willing and able to acquire the automobile companies, 
especially through a potentially long and tenuous bankruptcy.42  Given 
this environment, the court approved both transactions finding no 
realistic alternatives available.43
With the establishment of New Chrysler and the transaction that 
closed on June 10, 2009, the United States Treasury had a 9.85% stake 
while Export Development Canada had 2.46%.
 
2. The Chrysler Transaction 
44  The new retirement 
pension of the autoworkers—VEBA—had a 67.69% ownership interest 
and Fiat held 20%, with an opportunity to acquire more.45  The 
transaction also included the transfer of most of the operating assets 
from Chrysler to New Chrysler.46  For consideration, New Chrysler paid 
$2 billion to Chrysler and assumed many of its liabilities.47
Under the terms of sale finalized on July 10, 2009, New GM acquired 
all of GM’s assets with the exception of some cash, equity interests in 
other entities, property, and employee benefit plans.
 
3. The GM Transaction 
48
 
 40. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 479. 
 41. Id. at 480. 
 42. Id. at 484. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 92 n.11. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 92. 
 47. Id. 
 48. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 481. 
  New GM also 
assumed certain liabilities from the old entity in the areas of product 
7
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liability claims, warranty and recall obligations and all employee related 
obligations.49  The terms of the deal stipulated that the United States 
Treasury would own 60.8% of the common stock as well as $2.1 billion 
of New GM Series A preferred stock.  Export Development of Canada 
would own 11.7% of New GM’s common stock on an undiluted basis, 
as well as $400 million of New GM Series A Preferred Stock.50  The 
preexisting GM entity would own 10–12% of New GM’s common stock 
and the remaining 17.5% of common stock would be owned by the New 
Employees Beneficiary Association Trust.51
For GM, the § 363 transaction included the assignment of dealer 
franchise agreements for 4,100 of its 6,000 dealerships to New GM.
 
4. Rejected Dealer Franchise Agreements 
52  
These franchise agreements were modified to help make GM more 
competitive.53  However, New GM could not take every dealership on 
the same basis, so it had the option of either terminating certain 
agreements or agreeing to modified versions, known as “Participation 
Agreements.”54  For the dealerships that New GM would not go forward 
with, GM provided seventeen months notice before their “Deferred 
Termination Agreements” would be terminated.55  Both participation 
and deferred termination agreements included waivers of dealers’ rights 
in connection with their franchises.56
In addressing the Chrysler dealerships, the court was terse in its 
description of the process surrounding the franchise agreements to be 
rejected in the proposed transaction.
 
57  However, the court’s opinion did 
reference a motion by Chrysler from May 14, 2009 in which Chrysler 
sought to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases affecting 789 
domestic car dealerships.58  Approximately 3,200 dealerships were in 
operation at the time Chrysler filed bankruptcy.59
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 482. 
 51. Id. at 482–83. 
 52. Id. at 476. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. There is no section devoted to describing the Chrysler dealership network. 
 58. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 59. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Chrysler Closing 789 Dealerships, CNNMONEY.COM, May 15, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/14/autos/chrysler_dealer_closings/index.htm. 
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D. Dealership Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy 
In the GM case, Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Gerber addressed the 
claim that the termination of executory contracts between GM and 
certain dealerships was coerced and unlawful.60  Judge Gerber 
responded to the notion that the terminations were coerced by reminding 
the objecting parties that federal bankruptcy policy permits debtors, for 
the benefit of all creditors, to alter creditor and counterparty contractual 
rights.61  Next, the judge stated that for decades counterparties have had 
knowledge that their executory contracts could be rejected by 
bankruptcy debtors.62  Judge Gerber also refused to prohibit the 
modifications and rejections to dealership franchise agreements because 
such action would be “squarely inconsistent” with the purpose of 
corporate reorganizations.63  Finally, the court relied on Judge 
Gonzalez’s opinion from the Chrysler bankruptcy case that suggested 
that the rejection of dealership agreements was a valid exercise of 
business judgment.64
The court also addressed the legality of rejecting executory contracts 
when such rejection could violate state franchise laws.
 
65  The court 
stated that where state laws frustrate the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 365, 
they are preempted by federal bankruptcy law.66  Specifically, “to the 
extent that laws . . . —either state or federal—impair the ability to reject, 
or to assume and assign [franchise agreements], they must be trumped 
by federal bankruptcy law.”67  The court thus found the rejection of 
executory franchise agreements to be far from extraordinary within the 
reorganization process and concluded that making dealerships more 
competitive was not a bad thing, but rather, precisely the point.68
Despite the court’s refusal to reverse the termination of Chrysler and 
 
 
 60. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 513.  Interestingly, the party raising this issue was a non-
GM dealership that wanted the dealership agreements reinstated because GM was gaining a competitive 
advantage by being permitted to go through bankruptcy.  Thus, it seems their argument was to allow 
GM to proceed in hopes they would become insolvent, lessening competition in the auto industry. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 514. 
 63. Id. at 515. 
 64. Id.  The business judgment rule generally states that so long as the leaders of a corporation do 
not make a decision that no other reasonable person would make, courts will defer to their judgment 
because they are in the best situation to know what is in their corporation’s best interest. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (citing In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 205–06 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2009)) (“Where a 
state law ‘unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law will have to 
yield.’”). 
 68. Id. at 516. 
9
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GM dealerships, many dealerships still found the process unfair.  Their 
cause was strengthened by members of Congress, who demanded that 
Chrysler and GM provide the criteria used to reject franchise 
agreements.69
On December 16, 2009, Congress passed the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act.
  The ground was thus laid for Congress to take action to 
help alleviate the concerns of the thousands of dealerships affected by 
the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies. 
E. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 
70
Section 747 begins by defining key terms.  First, a “covered 
manufacturer” is defined as either an automobile manufacturer in which 
the United States has an ownership interest, a manufacturer to whom the 
United States has provided financial assistance under the Emergency 
Stabilization Act, or an automobile manufacturer “which acquired more 
than half of the assets of an automobile manufacturer in which the 
United States Government has an ownership interest.”
  The bill contained a myriad of appropriations for 
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010.  This Comment will focus on 
Section 747 of the Act, which deals with the arbitration process for those 
dealerships terminated through the Chrysler and GM Chapter 11 
proceedings. 
71  A “covered 
dealership” is one that had a franchise agreement for selling and 
servicing a particular brand or brands of a “covered manufacturer,” but 
had said agreement terminated, not assigned to another brand, not 
renewed, or not continued from October 3, 2008 through December 31, 
2010.72
Section 747 also states that covered manufacturers, within thirty days 
of the passage of the bill, had to provide all covered dealerships not 
lawfully terminated prior to April 29, 2009
 
73
 
 69. See H.R. RES. 591, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 70. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009). 
 71. Id. § 747(a)(1)(A)–(B).  Interestingly, this language essentially applies to only Chrysler and 
GM, yet the two are not referenced by name within the statutory language. 
 72. Id. § 747(a)(2). 
 with criteria for why they 
were terminated, not renewed, or not assumed and assigned to a covered 
 73. The usage of April 29, 2009 is extremely perplexing.  The public, as well as the dealerships 
themselves, only knew about the affected dealerships in the middle of May 2009.  See Valdes-Dapena, 
supra note 59.  Moreover, in looking at those dealerships that took advantage of the arbitration available 
to them in Section 747, it would appear that the numbers match those that were announced in the middle 
of May 2009.  Thus, the date seems to be entirely based on Chrysler’s filing for bankruptcy, which was 
April 30, 2009.  In other words, this was the latest date that Congress could put in the statute without 
blatantly butting heads with the decisions pursuant to the automobile manufacturers respective Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceedings. 
10
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manufacturer.74  Any qualifying dealer could elect to seek a binding 
arbitration within forty days of the passage of the bill against a covered 
manufacturer.75  Once a dealer elected to pursue arbitration, the case had 
to commence as soon as was practicable and then be submitted for a 
decision by the arbitrator no later than 180 days after passage of the 
bill.76
The statute further provided that the two parties could select an 
arbitrator from the Regional Office of the American Arbitration 
Association in the region in which the dealership was located.
 
77  The 
arbitration was to be conducted in the state where the dealership was 
located.78  Further, each party was responsible for its own expenses, 
fees, and costs, with the parties splitting equally all costs associated with 
the arbitration, such as arbitrator fees, meeting room charges, and 
administrative costs.79  No arbitration could result in the arbitrator 
awarding compensatory, punitive, or exemplary damages.80
Once in arbitration, dealers and manufacturers could present any 
relevant information they deemed necessary to argue their agreement 
was wrongfully terminated, and the arbitrator could balance the 
economic interests of the dealers, manufacturers, and the public at large 
when considering reinstating a dealership.
 
81  The arbitrator was also to 
examine seven factors before issuing each decision: (1) profitability of 
the dealership for the previous four years; (2) the manufacturer’s overall 
business plan; (3) the dealership’s current economic viability; (4) the 
dealership’s performance vis-à-vis the objectives within its franchise 
agreement; (5) the demographic and geographic characteristics of the 
dealership’s market territory; (6) the dealership’s performance in 
relation to the criteria used by the manufacturer to terminate, not renew, 
not assume, or not assign the covered dealership’s franchise agreement; 
and (7) the length of experience of the dealership.82
The Section also required arbitrators to issue written determinations 
 
 
 74. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 747(c), 123 Stat. 3034 
(2009). 
 75. Id. § 747(d). 
 76. Id.  However, for good cause, that period can be extended an additional thirty days.  Id.  A 
dealer and manufacturer can opt to voluntarily enter into a binding agreement after their own 
negotiations; however, such an agreement will represent a waiver of the dealership’s rights to pursue 
arbitration pursuant to Section 747.  Id. § 747(f). 
 77. Id. § 747(e). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. § 747(d).  The American Arbitration Association is neither an Article I nor an Article III 
court. 
 82. Id. 
11
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no later than seven business days after a case had been fully submitted.83  
The written determination of the arbitrator had to include: (1) a 
description of the dealership; (2) a clear statement that indicated whether 
the franchise agreement in dispute was to be renewed, continued, 
assigned, or assumed by a covered manufacturer; (3) the key facts relied 
upon in making the determination; and (4) an explanation of how the 
arbitrator’s decision was supported by the balance of economic 
interests.84  If an arbitrator decided in favor of a dealership, upon 
completion of necessary agreements and prerequisites, the dealership 
was to return any financial compensation previously provided by a 
manufacturer for its decision to terminate, not renew, not assign or not 
assume the covered dealership’s applicable franchise agreement.85
The Supreme Court has dealt with the separation of powers issues 
between Congress and the Judiciary on two occasions relevant to this 
Comment.  The first arose from the return of property captured by the 
United States government during the Civil War to the original 
Confederate owners.  In United States v. Klein, the Court addressed a 
congressional act aimed at limiting the ability of courts to hear evidence 
of former Confederates’ new oaths of allegiance to the United States.
 
The enactment of Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
appears to be an attempt by Congress to bypass the bankruptcy decisions 
of Chrysler and GM.  As the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 makes clear, bankruptcy courts have the ability to 
issue final decisions.  Using case law, the next Part addresses Congress’s 
ability to explicitly enact legislation that effectively limits the powers of 
the Judiciary. 
III. LEADING SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
86  
The second case involved a statue of limitation issue that barred a 
plaintiff from bringing a fraud and deceit claim under the Securities 
Exchange Act.  In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Incorporated, the Court 
found unconstitutional an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act to 
reopen final judgments of Article III courts.87
 
 83. Id. § 747(e). 
 84. Id. § 747(d). 
 85. Id. § 747(e). 
 86. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
 87. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 246 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
  Each case will be 
discussed in detail below. 
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A. United States v. Klein 
During and after the Civil War, Congress focused on reconstructing 
the Union.  One particular issue was how to address the proceeds of 
abandoned and captured property that the U.S. gained possession of 
during the war.  The government was forced to devise a way that 
Southerners, some of whom were formerly loyal to the Confederacy, 
could retain their property. 
In its first attempt to distribute property back to its rightful owners, 
Congress passed an act (Act I) on July 17, 1862 authorizing the 
President to extend pardon and amnesty to all persons who may have 
participated in the existing rebellion, with exceptions that he may deem 
convenient for the public welfare.88  Congress then passed the 
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863 (Act II), 
which allowed for the retention of property as long as the use of that 
property was not for carrying on war against the United States.89  With 
proof that one had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion, one class 
of individuals could retrieve their property.90
Finally, almost a year and a half after Congress had given the 
President the authority to pardon, President Lincoln, on December 8, 
1863, issued a proclamation that offered a full pardon, with restoration 
of all property rights, to qualifying individuals previously engaged in 
rebellion as actual participants or as aiders and abettors.
 
91  After a series 
of amended pardons via a proclamation, on December 25, 1868, the 
President issued a pardon available without exception, unconditionally, 
and without reservation to all who participated in the rebellion with no 
oath requirement.92
Congress, perhaps uncomfortable with former Confederates being 
granted leniency, repealed Act I, which authorized the President to 
pardon any and all with any conditions or qualifications he saw fit.
 
93
 
 88. Klein, 80 U.S at 130. 
 89. Id. at 130–31.  Arms, ships, steamboats, military supplies, and munitions were examples of 
excluded property to be returned.  Id. at 131. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 131–32.  The pardon was contingent on individuals taking an oath that promised that 
they would thereafter abide by and support the Constitution of the United States, all acts of Congress, 
and all proclamations of the President in reference to slaves.  Id. at 132. 
 92. Id. at 141. 
 93. Id. 
  
The Klein Court found this act of Congress to have little if any effect on 
the President’s pardon, as it would not reduce any obligations of 
Congress under the Constitution to give Lincoln’s proclamation its full 
13
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intended effect.94  Moreover, the Court could not envision a scenario in 
which those who had taken the oath would not be entitled to their 
property.95  The Klein Court stated that once the oath was taken, an 
individual had an absolute right to the restoration of his political rights 
and to deny the same would be a breach of faith by the government.96
With these facts in mind, the Court analyzed Klein’s case.  During the 
rebellion, V.F. Wilson had become the surety on bonds of several 
members of the Confederate army.
 
97  After President Lincoln’s 
proclamation on December 8, 1863, V.F. Wilson took an oath of 
allegiance.98  After Wilson’s death in 1965, Klein, the administrator of 
Wilson’s estate, filed a petition in the Court of Claims to obtain the 
proceeds of the cotton that Wilson had abandoned to the Treasury of the 
United States.99  In May 1869, the Court of Claims found Wilson’s 
estate was entitled to receive the proceeds of his cotton and allotted 
$125,300 to Klein.100  The United States appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court.101
While the appeal was pending, Congress passed a provision within a 
general appropriations bill that attempted to use the acceptance of a 
pardon as conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but not, however, as 
evidence of the rights conferred by the pardon in the Court of Claims
 
102 
or in the Supreme Court.103
[p]roof of loyalty is required to be made according to the provisions of 
certain statutes, irrespective of the effect of any executive proclamation, 
pardon, or amnesty, or act of oblivion; and when judgment has been 
already rendered on other proof of loyalty, the Supreme Court, on appeal, 
shall have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same 
for want of jurisdiction.
  The proviso also stated that: 
104
The Court saw the proviso of Congress as an attempt to deny the 
pardons granted by the presidential proclamations which Congress had 
 
 
 94. Id. at 142. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 132. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The Klein Court describes the history of the court of claims as originally assisting in the 
preparation of bills to be submitted to Congress.  However, the court of claims grew to have a larger 
jurisdiction and was authorized to render final judgments.  The court of claims thus exercised all the 
functions of a court, but was still an inferior court authorized by Congress.  Id. at 145. 
 103. Id. at 144. 
 104. Id. at 143. 
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/13
MORGALIS FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3 4/4/2011  12:03 PM 
2010] UNLAWFUL REPRIEVE 839 
originally authorized.105  Further, the language unambiguously denied 
the Court jurisdiction when certain circumstances presented themselves, 
which the Court said was “not an exercise of the acknowledged power of 
Congress.”106
To support its claim, the Court referenced its decision in 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co.  In Wheeling, the Court found that 
the bridge in question was a nuisance.
 
107  Subsequently, Congress 
passed an act legalizing the bridge and making it a “post-road.”108  The 
Court denied a motion to enforce its original holding, as it found that the 
bridge was no longer a nuisance because of a constitutionally 
permissible action taken by Congress.109  The Court distinguished the 
act at issue in Wheeling from the proviso now before it by observing that 
the Wheeling Court had found that Congress did not act arbitrarily and 
that the congressional act in Wheeling had created a set of new 
circumstances.110  In the Klein Court’s eyes, however, Congress’s 
actions dealing with the evidentiary value of presidential pardons did not 
create a set of new circumstances.111
The Court also referenced the Constitution’s language within Article 
III, which states “in all cases other than those of original jurisdiction, 
‘the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and 
fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress 
shall make.’”
 
112  From this language, Congress has the power to amend 
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but in the instance of the Court of 
Claims, Congress on the one hand granted appellate review, and then 
through the proviso, took it away.113  The Klein Court found that 
Congress aimed to circumvent the Court of Claims’s final decision 
because of the unfavorable results to the government.114
In 1995, Justice Scalia wrote for the court in Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. which addressed the question of whether § 27A(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violated the Constitution’s separation 
 
B. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 
 
 105. Id. at 145. 
 106. Id. at 146. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 146–47 (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 147. 
 112. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
15
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of powers principle and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.115  The case originated in the Eastern District of Kentucky, 
where Plaut brought claims against Spendthrift alleging fraud and deceit 
in the selling of stock in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 as well as rule 10b-5 of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.116  The case was ultimately not decided on its 
merits as claims brought under Rule 10b-5 had to be commenced one 
year after discovery of the facts surrounding the violation and within 
three years of the actual violation.117  Thus, the statute of limitations for 
Plaut’s claim had run, and the federal court accordingly dismissed the 
case with prejudice.118  In September 1991, the decision became final 
because an appeal was not filed within thirty days of the dismissal.119
Three months later, the President signed the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 into law, which gave 
Plaut some new procedural options.
 
120
 (2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period 
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles 
of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be 
reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after 
December 19, 1991.
  Section 476 of the Act read: 
(a) Effect on pending causes of action 
 The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 
78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] that 
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period 
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of 
retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991. 
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action 
 Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that 
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991— 
 (1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, 
and 
121
 
 115. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 213 (1995).  Specifically, the Court looked at 
the constitutionality of § 10(b) of the Act’s requirement for federal courts to reopen final judgments in 
private civil actions.  Id.  The decision was a 7–2 majority decision with Justices Rehnquist, C. J., 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joining Justice Scalia’s opinion.  Justice Breyer filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment.  Id. at 240 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens filed a 
dissenting opinion that Justice Ginsburg joined.  Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 214. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 214–15. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1988 ed., Supp. V)). 
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Using these new procedural options, Plaut filed a motion to reinstate his 
previously dismissed action; the district court found that Plaut satisfied 
the statutory language, but also held that § 27A(b) was 
unconstitutional.122  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s decision.123
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia first addressed the argument 
suggesting the statute did not call on courts to reopen final judgments 
because the language “the laws applicable in the jurisdiction” referenced 
the law announced in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson.
 
124  However, Justice Scalia stated that Lampf provided a 
uniform national statute of limitations, as opposed to a jurisdiction-
specific one, and therefore, the new statute could not be construed as 
referencing Lampf because the language would be contradictory.125
Plaut suggested another possible reason the statute did not require 
courts to reopen final decisions was that the statutory language allegedly 
only applied to cases that were still pending.
 
126  Finding this argument 
weakened in light of the fact that pending cases could not be reinstated, 
Justice Scalia concluded that there was no “reasonable construction on 
which § 27A(b) does not require federal courts to reopen final 
judgments in suits dismissed with prejudice by virtue of Lampf.”127
The majority opinion discussed prior Supreme Court decisions and 
identified ways in which certain legislation may run counter to Article 
III of the Constitution.
 
128  The first was the Klein doctrine,129 which 
found a statute to impermissibly limit the capacity of the judicial 
department in cases before it.130  Second, members of the Executive 
Branch could not be empowered by Congress to review decisions of 
Article III courts.131  The Court found § 27A(b) different from either 
scenario, so Justice Scalia focused on the “deeply rooted” power of the 
Article III courts to conclusively decide matters before them as well as 
the notion that only superior Article III courts had the power to review 
final judgments.132
 
 122. Id. at 215. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 215–16. 
 125. Id. at 216. 
 126. Id. at 217. 
 127. Id. at 217. 
 128. Id. at 218. 
 129. See supra Part III.A. 
 130. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 218–19. 
  Because § 27A(b) retroactively commanded the 
federal courts to reopen final judgments, the Plaut Court found that 
17
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Congress had disregarded the fundamental principle that only the 
judiciary could issue dispositive judgments.133
To support the conclusion that Congress had acted impermissibly, the 
Court relied on documents from the pre-constitutional era which shared 
a common theme: there should be a sharp division between legislative 
and judicial powers.
 
134
[t]he theory neither of the British, nor the state constitutions, authorises 
the revisal of a judicial sentence, by a legislative act. . . . A legislature 
without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, 
in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future  
cases.
  Echoing this same motif, the Court also cited 
Alexander Hamilton, who said: 
135
Finally, the Court referenced case law that found the legislative branch 
lacking the power to set aside, vacate, or annul a final judgment of an 
Article III court.
 
136
The Court acknowledged that Congress could always revise Article 
III court judgments by making new laws that must then be applied to 
cases still pending on appeal.
 
137  The Court then reiterated that the 
function of appellate courts was to decide cases on the law existing at 
the time of the appeal, and thus, the Court discussed the feasibility of an 
appellate court reversing an inferior court based on a change in the 
law.138  Justice Scalia noted a key difference between cases on appeal 
and those having received final decisions: “[h]aving achieved finality, 
however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial 
department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress 
may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that 
very case was something other than what the courts said it was.”139
 
 133. Id. at 219. 
 134. Id. at 220 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81). 
 135. Id. at 222. 
 136. Id. at 223–26 (referencing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. 
Chip. 77 (Vt. 1824); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman 
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. 641, 647–48 (1875); 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1856)). 
 137. Id. at 226 (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at 227 (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. 
  In 
the present case, § 27A(b) purported to allow revisiting final judgments 
in cases that were properly dismissed based on statute of limitation 
grounds; the Court held that no legislative act could rescind such 
judgments for “even the very best of reasons, such as the legislature’s 
genuine conviction (supported by all the law professors in the land) that 
18
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the judgment was wrong; and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final 
judgments are legislatively dissolved.”140
The Klein and Plaut cases present rare times in American 
jurisprudence where the Court was asked whether Congress exceeded its 
constitutional powers to effectively limit the powers of the Judiciary.  It 
is clear the Court in both instances found the congressional act before it 
to be impermissible.  However, neither case explicitly dealt with non-
Article III courts.
 
141
 
 140. Id. at 228. 
 141. Although Klein dealt with a court of claims—a non-Article III court—scholarship is quite 
clear that Klein’s exact holding cannot be that narrow.  See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 304 (6th ed. 2009) (suggesting that 
there are at least four possible interpretations of Klein: (1) Congress cannot grant jurisdiction to a certain 
degree and then force jurisdiction to cease when special circumstances arise; (2) Congress cannot dictate 
rules to the Judiciary for cases pending before it; (3) Congress cannot infringe on the power of the 
Executive by rescinding a presidential pardon; and (4) Congress cannot make exceptions and 
prescriptions to the appellate power of the Judiciary). 
  Part IV will address the application of Klein and 
Plaut with respect to the bankruptcy courts decisions in Chrysler and 
GM. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This Part develops the authority of non-Article III courts as it pertains 
to their autonomy and ability to issue final judicial decisions.  Upon 
establishing that the bankruptcy decisions in Chrysler and GM were 
final, the applicability of Klein and Plaut will be discussed.  This Part 
then analyzes the outcome of Section 747 and concludes that despite the 
impermissible actions of Congress, Chrysler and GM will not likely 
challenge the constitutionality of the statute.  Finally, this Part outlines 
the potential perils that accompany the precedent set forth by Section 
747. 
A. Finality of Decisions in Non-Article III Bankruptcy Courts 
The Klein and Plaut decisions did not directly address either the 
status of bankruptcy courts as non-Article III courts or their ability to 
issue final decisions.  Before analyzing the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies under Klein and Plaut, however, this subsection will 
establishes that bankruptcy courts are actually quite similar to Article III 
courts because of their autonomy.  This subsection then suggests that the 
bankruptcy decisions of Chrysler and GM were both final decisions. 
 
19
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1. Bankruptcy Courts Enjoy Autonomy Similar to That of Article III 
Courts 
The plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline makes clear the dichotomy 
between Article III courts and Article I courts.  For the Court, the lack of 
life tenure and a fixed salary were enough to differentiate the two.142  
However, the fact that the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 only established fourteen year terms and salaries 
determined by statute for bankruptcy judges does not preclude 
bankruptcy courts from similar autonomy as Article III courts.  To the 
contrary, some scholars suggest that bankruptcy courts are actually more 
insulated from political pressures despite their lack of tenure and fixed 
salary.143  Because bankruptcy judges are appointed based on their 
professional merit and not on their political ideology, they are less 
susceptible to outside political influence.144
Another component of the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion was 
the belief that placing non-Article III judges on par with Article III 
judges could dilute the prestige and high public opinion of federal 
courts.
 
145  However, bankruptcy courts are now widely recognized as an 
extension of Article III courts.146  As Justice White’s dissent noted in 
Northern Pipeline, bankruptcy courts handle matters that Article III 
judges have little interest in adjudicating.147  It is thus not surprising that 
despite the fact that Article III courts have appellate review over 
bankruptcy decisions, Article III courts give great deference to 
bankruptcy court decisions, and as a result, hear few cases on appeal.148
 
 142. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) (plurality 
opinion). 
 143. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 747, 793 (2010) (suggesting that bankruptcy judges are independent because they are selected 
on merit and not political ideology and they do not seek higher offices). 
 144. Id.  Moreover, the “connection between the bench and the bar, and the lingering desire for 
professional integrity, individualism, and reputation, provide the insulation from political actors 
expected of Article III courts.”  Id. at 805. 
 145. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 n.10. 
  
This trend is equally present for bankruptcy decisions dealing with 
 146. McKenzie, supra note 143, at 766 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)). 
 147. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 116 (White, J., dissenting). 
 148. McKenzie, supra note 143, at 777. (“There are at least three reasons for the low rate of 
bankruptcy appeals.  As an initial matter, the standard of review in appeals of bankruptcy decisions is 
deferential to bankruptcy judges on key—and often determinative—questions.  Second, the constraints 
of bankruptcy litigation, with its ever-present pressures of time and concerns about draining the debtor’s 
estate by litigation costs, also limit the likelihood of frequent and effective appellate review.  In addition, 
the Article III judiciary does not have a keen appetite for bankruptcy cases, a fact that tends to dampen 
the impact of bankruptcy appeals.”).  In some instances, appeals of bankruptcy court decisions have 
even been given to magistrate judges before district judges.  Id. at 791. 
20
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major asset sales like Chrysler and GM, making bankruptcy courts 
“immune from attack” from appellate courts in all but rare 
circumstances.149
In analyzing the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies vis-à-vis Congress’s 
subsequent action, it must be determined whether the decisions were 
final.  In the instance of Chrysler, the finality analysis is straight-
forward.  The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984 is explicit that circuit courts have appellate review of all “final 
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” when certain issues have not 
been previously addressed, when a split among courts exists on an issue, 
or when an immediate appeal “may materially advance the progress of 
the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken.”
  The argument can thus be made that, practically 
speaking, bankruptcy courts today are currently as impartial and immune 
from political pressures as Article III judges and their decisions, when 
reviewed, are given great deference by Article III courts. 
2. Chrysler and GM Were Final Bankruptcy Decisions 
150  Federal 
appellate courts do not, however, review the opinions, factual findings, 
reasoning, or explanation of bankruptcy judges.151  Thus, from the 
statutory language, and the fact that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the case,152
The finality of In re General Motors is also evident.  A bankruptcy 
final order is one that resolves litigation, decides the merits, or 
determines the rights of any party to the bankruptcy case.
 it is conclusive that In re Chrysler was a final 
decision when it was issued, and the subsequent affirmation by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals only strengthened its finality. 
153  Other 
courts have determined that a bankruptcy decision is final if the 
litigation is decided on the merits, and there is nothing left for the court 
to do but execute the judgment.154
 
 149. Id. at 778 (citing Rachael M. Jackson, Note, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a 
Post-Enron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 451). 
 150. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 151. Spierer v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.), 328 F.3d 829, 833 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
 152. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 127 (2d. 
Cir. 2009) (“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the June 1, 2009 order of the bankruptcy court 
authorizing the Sale.”). 
 153. White v. Univision of Va., Inc. (In re Urban Broadcasting Corp.), 304 B.R. 263 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 401 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 154. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Farmland Indus. (In re Farmland Indus., 
Inc.), 397 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 2005). 
  Where there are activities still to be 
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carried out by the court, a final decision has not been entered.155  
However, where a bankruptcy proceeding is akin to orders that were 
deemed final in other bankruptcy cases, that precedent can be considered 
dispositive on the similar case in question.156
Given the definitions of finality found in the case law, Judge Gerber’s 
decision in In re General Motors was final.  After a very thorough 
review of all the petitions before him, Judge Gerber thought that GM’s 
sale to New GM was the only way to save the company in the prescribed 
time frame.  The only remaining action after his decision was to execute 
the sale, and thus, the decision could be considered final.  In addition, 
aggrieved parties appealed to the district court asking it to grant a stay in 
order to prevent the sale, but the court refused to overturn the 
“exhaustive, careful, and thoughtful decision” and allowed the 
transaction to close.
 
157
A possible holding of Klein was that Congress cannot prescribe rules 
that limit appellate review procedures of the judicial branch for cases 
still pending.
  Finally, because the opinion of Judge Gerber 
followed closely paralleled Judge Gonzalez’s In re Chrysler opinion, it 
could be assumed that the circuit court’s affirmation of In re Chrysler 
was dispositive for the GM decision as well.  Judge Gerber’s decision 
can thus be deemed a final decision because it left nothing else for the 
court to do, the district court denied the stay enabling the sale, and the 
Second Circuit’s affirmation in the Chrysler case was controlling in the 
GM decision. 
B. Applying the Holdings of Klein and Plaut to Section 747 
With the bankruptcy decisions of Chrysler and GM determined to be 
final, the next question is whether the enactment of Section 747 by 
Congress was constitutional under Klein and Plaut.  It will be suggested 
that the application of Klein to Section 747 does not conclusively yield 
that Congress’s actions were constitutionally impermissible.  However, 
because Section 747 reopens final judgments, it is unconstitutional under 
Plaut. 
1. Klein Analysis 
158
 
 155. WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Ent., Inc., 402 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 156. Nova Info. Sys. v. Premier Operations (In re Premier Operations, Ltd.), 290 B.R. 33, 42 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 157. In re GMC, No. 09-50026, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61279 (S.D.N.Y. July, 9, 2009). 
  This holding, however, does not directly address the 
 158. See supra note 141. 
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constitutionality of Section 747.  First, both the Chrysler and GM asset 
sales were completed in the summer of 2009, making their respective 
bankruptcies effectively finalized.  Moreover, both decisions were final, 
and, therefore, neither can be thought of as still pending.  Also making 
Klein inapposite in this case is that Section 747 does not change the 
circumstances of the issues before the court.  Even assuming the cases 
were no longer pending and Section 747 did not change the 
circumstances surrounding the bankruptcies, a potential application of 
Klein cannot be dismissed. 
It does not appear that the intent of Section 747 was to create rules 
that denied courts appellate review of the bankruptcy proceedings of 
Chrysler and GM.  Rather, the aim of Section 747 was to create an 
option for certain dealerships to be granted reinstatement of their 
franchise agreements via an arbitration process.  But the fact that the 
statutory language does not deny appellate review may not end the 
analysis.  The effect of Section 747 was to give dealerships an additional 
option beyond the appeal available to them during the bankruptcy 
process.  Thus, although dealerships had a chance to appeal the Chrysler 
and GM decisions to reduce their dealership networks, Section 747 
could be seen as circumventing the judicial review process by granting 
appellate jurisdiction to an arbitrator that is not the Judiciary—possibly 
making it legislation that might be perceived as invading the “judicial 
province.”159
Another possible holding of Klein may be that Congress cannot create 
“a means to an end” to remedy an unfavorable outcome.
 
160  In Klein, it 
was clear that members of Congress were privy to the inevitable truth 
that many of those Southerners that fought against the Union would be 
given back their property so long as they pledged their loyalty via an 
oath.  The statute was created for the sole purpose of preventing such an 
inevitable outcome.161  Similarly, Section 747 is the work of Congress to 
right the wrong that purportedly resulted from the rejection of 
dealerships nationwide.  The House and Senate spoke of the pillars that 
car dealerships represented to this country and their respective cities.162
 
 159. Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010) 
(suggesting that Klein may stand for the proposition that Congress should be prevented from “enacting 
legislation that genuinely might so invade the judicial province”). 
  
Congress also found the governmental taskforce assigned to evaluate the 
 160. See supra note 141. 
 161. Senator Edmunds, in response to a question whether the provision at issue in Klein would 
simply require dismissal of the appeal leaving the lower court’s judgment intact said, “No; . . . we say 
they shall dismiss the case out of court for want of jurisdiction; not dismiss the appeal, but dismiss the 
case—everything.”  Id. (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3824 (1870)). 
 162. 155 CONG. REC. S13,128 (2009); 155 CONG. REC. H14,477 (2009). 
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financial viability of Chrysler and GM unqualified to make judgments 
on which dealerships to keep and which to terminate.163
There are thus two possible applications of Klein to Section 747.  
First, Section 747 could be seen as granting appeals to dealerships using 
arbitrators, thereby bypassing an appellate review process statutorily 
granted by Congress to the Judiciary.  However, Congress could argue it 
has the right to amend the appellate review process for non-Article III 
bankruptcy courts because it originally created the appellate review 
process in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984.  Second, Section 747 is a clear act by Congress to correct what 
they found to be an unfair result of bankruptcy.  This argument is 
similarly weakened considering that Congress often enacts statutes to 
remedy outcomes it disagrees with.  Because the two potential 
applications of Klein are not particularly compelling and because Klein’s 
application in general is questioned by scholars,
  Similar to Klein 
then, with a little less than a year before all affected dealerships would 
be closing their lots, Congress stepped in to remedy a situation they 
found unsatisfactory. 
164
The fact pattern in Plaut, while not identical, appears quite similar to 
the facts surrounding the enactment of Section 747.  In Plaut, Congress 
created a law that provided that any claims previously dismissed under 
the old statute of limitations, that would have a different outcome with 
the new statute of limitations, should be reinstated.
 a constitutional 
challenge to Section 747 under Klein is improbable. 
2. Plaut Analysis 
165  The Plaut Court 
found “no instance in which Congress ha[d] attempted to set aside the 
final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation.”166  
Justice Scalia thus found that the new statute retroactively reopened final 
judgments, and was therefore beyond the powers vested in Congress by 
the Constitution.167
As was mentioned in subsection IV.A, the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies were final decisions.  Section 747 explicitly reopens 
matters that were already adjudicated and gives dealerships the right to 
 
 
 163. 155 CONG. REC. H14,475 (2009). 
 164. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (expressing uncertainty as to 
the precise scope of Klein); Nat’l Coalition to Save our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d. 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (stating “Klein’s exact meaning is far from clear”). 
 165. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15. 
 166. Id. at 230. 
 167. Id. at 227. 
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appeal the rejection of their executory contracts to an arbitrator.  The 
intent of the statute to retroactively go around the bankruptcy court’s 
final decisions cannot be ignored when looking at the final comments 
made in Congress just before the bill passed: 
 [Senator] Stabenow[:] When negotiating an agreement for arbitration 
was it the Chairman’s intent that the dealers entitled to this arbitration 
process would only be the dealers that were terminated as a result of the 
bankruptcy? 
 [Senator] Durbin[:] Yes, it is my understanding that the only 
dealerships entitled to arbitration are those dealerships that were 
terminated as a result of the manufacturers’ bankruptcy, rather than those 
that may have closed for other business reasons.168
Through January 27, 2010, four hundred nine Chrysler dealerships 
whose contracts were rejected during bankruptcy filed for arbitration.
 
Thus, because the intent of the statute is clearly to reopen final decisions 
of bankruptcy courts, it is likely that a court could find Congress 
exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting Section 747. 
C. The Aftermath of Section 747 for GM and Chrysler 
169  
On March 6, 2010, GM announced that 661 of the roughly 1,100 dealers 
that applied to go through the arbitration process would be reinstated as 
part of the dealership network.170
Listening to the voices of lawmakers, one would believe that the 
outcome of their legislation was optimal.  The “short-sighted” 
  While these numbers suggest that the 
legislation had the effect Congress intended, three questions remain: (1) 
did the legislation have a beneficial effect; (2) why do not Chrysler and 
GM contest the constitutionality of the congressional mandate that 
forces them to arbitrate; and (3) what is to stop Congress from enacting 
similar legislation in the future? 
1. An Undesirable Outcome for GM and Chrysler 
 
 168. 155 CONG. REC. S13,130 (2009). 
 169. See Edward Niedermeyer, 1,550 Dealers Filed For Arbitration, THE TRUTH ABOUT CARS, 
Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/tag/rejected-dealer/; CHRYSLER GROUP LLC AND 
CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES, UNAUDITED INTERIM CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2010, at 14 (2010), available at 
chryslercorp.net/pdf/news/3-31-10-financial-statement.pdf (“Approximately 400 of those rejected 
dealers have filed for arbitration seeking to be added to the Company’s dealer network based on the 
criteria set forth in the legislation.”). 
 170. Nick Bunkley, Eye on Sales, G.M. Offers to Reinstate 661 Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2010, at B1. 
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bankruptcy decisions to reject dealership contracts were reversed.171  As 
a result, 661 GM dealerships and 50 Chrysler dealerships reopened their 
doors.172  The reinstatement of dealerships perhaps provided revenge 
against an auto taskforce that determined the dealership network needed 
to be trimmed in early 2009—the same auto taskforce deemed “a strange 
collection of people that didn’t have any experience in the auto industry” 
because many members did not own cars and those that did, owned 
foreign cars.173
Despite the jobs and the economic interest of the public at large, the 
effect of Section 747 on GM and Chrysler has been anything but 
optimal.  First, although President Obama signed the bill, the same day 
GM announced its reinstatement of 661 dealerships, the press reported 
“[t]he White House has opposed [Section 747] over concerns that it 
could hurt GM’s and Chrysler’s efforts to rebound from their 
government-led bankruptcies.”
 
174  Second, the same sentiment was 
echoed by the director of GM’s dealer network, who said, “[b]y 
[reinstating dealerships], we save a lot of time, energy and dollars, 
saving us and dealers from going through what could be a very long 
arbitration process.”175
The Plaut holding is clear that Section 747 is unconstitutional because 
it retroactively reopened final decisions of bankruptcy courts.  However, 
  Finally, the legislation ignores the rights of 
creditors that likely agreed on settlement terms based on the knowledge 
that the number of dealerships within Chrysler and GM would be 
reduced.  Despite these sentiments, Section 747 opened the door to 
numerous arbitrations that were both time consuming and costly and 
allowed dealerships to reopen the issues that were already deemed to 
have a detrimental effect on Chrysler and GM’s competitiveness.  Thus, 
the end result of Congress enacting Section 747 was Chrysler and GM 
agreeing to reinstate dealerships, not because it was necessarily in the 
best interest of the corporation, their shareholders, or the creditors of 
either, but because they could not afford to allocate the resources to deal 
with all the arbitrations in the four-month window the statute provided. 
2. Unlikely Constitutional Challenge 
 
 171. 155 CONG. REC. H14,477 (2009). 
 172. Nick Bunkley, Chrysler Offers Reinstatement to 86 Dealerships It Told to Close, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at B3. 
 173. 155 CONG. REC. H14,475 (2009). 
 174. Mike Boyer, GM Will Reinstate 661 Dealerships, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 6, 2010, at 
A11. 
 175. Bunkley, supra note 170. 
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it is not surprising that GM and Chrysler have not filed any lawsuit 
challenging the congressional mandate.  Chrysler’s CEO, Sergio 
Marchionne, has publicly expressed his desire to challenge the 
constitutionality of the arbitrations, but has yet to act.176
With an ownership stake in both companies, Congress justified 
Section 747 as one way that taxpayers would see the quickest return on 
their investment in the companies.
  Marchionne 
and Edward Whitacre, GM’s CEO, are in uniquely precarious positions 
to take a strong stance against Congress. 
Since the latter part of 2008, the economic environment that Chrysler 
and GM faced was arguably unlike anything they had experienced in 
their storied pasts.  Their financial situations necessitated the receipt of 
government bailout money that allowed them to stay in business.  As 
explained in subsection II.C.1, in the spring of 2009, the companies 
were left with few options but to file bankruptcy and subsequently sell 
their assets to create new entities.  However, the structuring of the deals 
left the United States Treasury essentially the owner of 12% of Chrysler 
and 62% GM. 
177
Another reason why Chrysler or GM executives may be reticent to 
challenge Section 747 would be the turnover of leadership prior to their 
bankruptcies.  Since the government has become involved with the auto 
dealerships, the Obama Administration has not been shy about 
threatening to replace leadership at the companies.
  In Congress’s view, reinstating 
dealerships across the nation was indubitably an action that would 
benefit Chrysler and GM—notwithstanding the likelihood that the 
elimination of the dealerships may actually have been in the best interest 
of GM and Chrysler.  Congress failed to acknowledge this possibility, 
and instead, followed its own business judgment on what it thought was 
best because of the possible implications on taxpayers, rather than what 
Chrysler and GM independently thought was best based on the evolving 
demands to be successful in the automotive industry.  Regardless of 
which side was “correct” in this debate, the knowledge that GM and 
Chrysler may not exist without receiving troubled asset relief money 
(TARP) or having the United States Treasury as a stakeholder is likely 
sufficient to prevent the threat of a constitutional challenge. 
178
 
 176. Krisher, Dealers Appeal, supra note 
  While it may be 
unlikely that a constitutional challenge would lead to such a drastic 
result, the federal government’s majority stake in GM makes such an 
action possible.  Because the United State Treasury is a large 
4. 
 177. 155 CONG. REC. H14, 478–79 (2009). 
 178. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Do or Die for GM and Chrysler, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 30, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/29/news/companies/gm_bailout/index.htm. 
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stakeholder in Chrysler and GM, either could effectively oust certain 
leaders for unpopular moves, making a constitutional challenge of 
Section 747 by Chrysler or GM unlikely. 
3. A Dangerous Precedent 
With a constitutional challenge of Congress’s actions by Chrysler or 
GM unlikely, the precedent established by Section 747 could start a new 
trend for creditors in bankruptcy.  Congress felt that the bankruptcy 
process was unfair to rejected Chrysler and GM dealerships.  Moreover, 
Congress noted that the dealerships were integral parts to communities 
around America.  With such rationale as an explanation for why 
dealerships should be reinstated, the question becomes: What creditor, 
who has had their own executory contracts rejected via a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, cannot make the same argument for Congress to grant them 
arbitration, with a chance of the reinstatement of their contract?  Will the 
creditor have to be the same size as Chrysler and GM?  Will the creditor 
need to demonstrate a presence in all fifty states?  Will the loss of jobs 
to hundreds or thousands of American workers because of the rejected 
contract be sufficient?  If all are perquisites for congressional action, 
perhaps few entities will qualify.  However, it is fair to assume that at 
least some entities could satisfy all of these arbitrary requirements, as 
well as making the claim of being treated unfairly and being integral 
parts to their communities.  If such action by Congress gains traction, it 
will undermine the authority of bankruptcy decisions because there will 
always be the possibility of an exception that could be granted by 
Congress. 
Moreover, the repercussions of Section 747 may not be exclusively 
limited to bankruptcy decisions.  Because Congress has effectively 
reopened final decisions of an arm of the Judiciary and has not been 
challenged for its actions, there exists precedent for Congress to 
retroactively act on final judicial decisions from Article I and Article III 
courts in the future.  In sum, the true effects of Section 747 are not yet 
readily discernible but the potential for a dangerous precedent cannot be 
denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act is likely to be 
viewed as a piece of legislation that helped dealerships across the United 
States re-establish their storied histories with Chrysler and GM.  
Members of Congress can say they successfully represented the rights of 
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their constituents by restoring employment for some and exposing others 
to American automobiles and servicing facilities.  To the average 
observer, Section 747 gave reprieve to the victims of two iconic 
bankruptcies. 
However, as demonstrated in this Comment, the rejection of the 
executory contracts by debtors in bankruptcy is far from extraordinary.  
Such actions by debtors are commonplace in Chapter 11 reorganizations 
as companies attempt to reincarnate themselves as leaner, more cost-
efficient versions of their previous selves.  Moreover, the sales of assets 
as well as the rejection of franchise agreements of Chrysler and GM 
were presented to bankruptcy judges and found to be permissible given 
the dire financial circumstances of each corporation. 
Given the final judgments of the courts on each of the bankruptcy 
sales, there can be little doubt that the actions of Congress were 
designed to evade the bankruptcy and appellate court rulings.  Because 
the decisions were not pending on appeal, and were final, it is clear that 
Section 747 is retroactive legislation, and thus unconstitutional under 
Plaut.  However, given the unique fact that a constitutional challenge 
regarding the powers of the federal government would be challenging 
the same entity that is a large equity owner in each auto manufacturer, 
the chances of Chrysler or GM challenging the statute is unlikely, and 
therefore, creates a dangerous precedent by opening the door to similar 
retroactive legislation in the future. 
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